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Abstract 
 
The EBU represents a clear investment in administrative integration with clear 
implications for the constitutional features of the EU. This paper aims to give an analysis 
of the administrative arrangements, through which the functions of supervision and 
resolution are affecting the single financial market. This case study is very interesting 
because these functions represent a genuine novelty in the history of financial integration 
since they are pre-ordained to a specific public interest: financial stability. Particularly, they 
cause a shift in the decision gradient from the technical to the political, as market integrity 
is less and less the key interest compared to financial stability. However, this wider 
discretionary power is not adequately counteracted by checks and balances in favour of 
accountability. As a result, the EBU makes a new contribution to the well-known 
‘fragmentation of the executive power’ of the EU by introducing a new governance tool 
positioned between the Communitarian and Intergovernmental Method, but its 
development is still full of uncertainties given that constitutional equilibrium is far from 
being definitively reached. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this particularly delicate stage of EU history there are increasing initiatives that 
attempt to establish new governance mechanisms with the purpose of strengthening the 
effective functioning of European institutions and policies. Primarily political difficulties 
contend with organizational engineering solutions that appear to be trying out new ways to 
strengthen reasons for unity. The European Banking Union (EBU) is a paradigmatic 
example that lends itself to analyzing such choices. 
Many early comments dedicated to the EBU stressed the originality of this solution, 
opining that it represented a new stage of administrative European integration (Clarich 
2013; Laguna de Paz 2014; Kern 2015). The EBU is a powerful investment in 
administrative integration (E. Chiti 2013), whose principal innovation is to create complex 
operating mechanisms based on a combination of different techniques (Ibrido 2017, 205-
216). For instance, exclusivity, direction, coordination and cooperation together define 
lines of transmission in the exercise of administrative functions for supervising and 
resolving credit institutions, which allow national and European administrative structures 
to act in a synchronized manner.I Not surprisingly, when we speak of the EBU, reference is 
made to system contexts and to operations portrayed as operating mechanisms, where 
ordinary operating techniques of administration are not distinct but assembled to yield a 
single definition of administrative issues. There is no simplistic European-type 
predominance of national administrations, nor is there any direct reliance on national 
authorities to apply the rules, decisions and measures agreed on at the European level. The 
boundaries between the two classic models of administration, a centralized one and a 
decentralized, indirect one – more or less hardened, have become decidedly fuzzier (Avbelj 
2015, 792-795). 
This work focuses on verifying which elements this solution adds to the already varied 
and imaginative outcomes to which the EU has accustomed us. Is the EBU the new tribute 
paid to the EU’s fervent engineering innovation? Are we in the presence of a new kind of 
public power? What is added by this new stage of development in organizational models? 
What constitutional implications are involved? And, most importantly, what is the 
relationship with the internal market, and especially the credit market? 
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Answering these questions means checking if the new solution simply establishes a line 
of continuity with more traditional solutions, or if it marks, if not a discontinuity, a change. 
In order for this work to be at all useful, Section 2 will deal with the causes that led to the 
establishment of the EBU; Section 3 the links between the EBU and the internal market, 
especially (in Section 4) the regulation of State aid in troubleshooting procedures; Section 5, 
the extent to which financial stability in the single market involves the public interest; 
Section 6, issues concerning accountability; and Section 7, concluding remarks. 
 
2. Origin of  the EBU 
 
When in 2012 the EBU project was launched with a communication from the 
European Commission,II the EU had already been hit by the financial crisis, and had 
already taken steps to define its new supervisory financial system (ESFS), based on the De 
Larosière report. What followed was that the EBU embodied a reaction that, on the one 
hand, signalled the inadequacy of the tools designed until then, and, on the other, grappled 
with more specific problems, especially regarding Eurozone stability, greatly threatened by 
the precarious control of national budgets. 
Starting with the first point, namely the inadequacy of the tools designed up to 2012, 
this means emphasizing that the EBU intended to interrupt the hitherto firm principle of 
home country control, which established rule sharing at the European level, leaving the 
Member States with the task of ensuring the supervision of financial institutions 
(Schoenmaker 2012). Of course, the pre-EBU scenario was not the result of an unchanged 
status of decades, but was in turn the result of several phases, all centred on bringing about 
a single internal market (Lamandini 2003). The first phase was characterized by the jumble 
of classic tools through which the EU reinforced its integration through law over the years, 
namely the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the 
legislative technique of harmonisation (Bartl 2015). With these tools the EU simply 
removed the legal and administrative obstacles that prevented the completion of the single 
internal market in the financial sector. It defined an operating system whose administrative 
machinery of government remained largely national, albeit increasingly conditioned by 
European rules. 
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The establishment of European administrative machinery with a supportive, 
coordinating function was unsuccessfully attempted in 1999 on the basis of the Financial 
Services Action Plan, but just ten years later, when the financial crisis erupted, it came into 
being thanks to the establishment of three agencies and of the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB).III The construction of a new administrative apparatus alongside the 
European Commission aimed to create a more careful and precise system of unitary 
regulation that was not limited to general aspects, but that could draw up more focused 
rules, reference standards and guarantees of shared information, more timely interventions 
in times of crisis, as well as rules for resolving conflicts between national authorities in the 
various financial market segments. In other words, the ESFS reinforced the European 
dimension of financial market governance by acting mainly on technical and administrative 
control, but with the intent to totally restrict itself to improving the internal market 
(Simoncini 2015b). The agencies did not strip administrative functions from the national to 
the European level, but had a purely technical, supportive role toward the European 
Commission, being connected directly to the Member States and their technical 
representative authorities. The traditional model of building the single market remained 
substantially respected through certain constants: a) action was primarily focused on 
regulation; b) the purpose was to level the playing field of market participants mainly in 
order to achieve freedom of movement of capital; c) the technical function of European 
regulators remained unchanged, both those of an institutional nature, such as the 
Commission, and new ones, represented by agencies that guaranteed a balanced regulatory 
framework. 
In this context the substantial cohesiveness of European interventions, albeit marked 
by distinct phases, is useful in order to further emphasize that recourse to the system of 
agencies in the financial field was not – in turn – without innovative elements. The 
financial agencies were also granted direct decision-making powers that seemed to clearly 
exceed the historic, consolidated system of the “Meroni doctrine", in keeping with a 
recently emerged revision of European law. Proof of this were the powers granted to the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) in cases of emergency, and those in which it resolves 
conflicts with national authorities. This statement is confirmed by the ESMA case,IV where 
the CJEU ruled that the granting of discretionary powers to the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) did not of itself constitute a violation of the “Meroni doctrine” 
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if power granted was exercised within the context of well-defined principles that, however, 
made it possible to circumscribe its exercise in such a way as to not give the agency a 
power free from any predetermined limit. Although the judge strove to contain the 
decision within a framework of consolidated compatibility of jurisprudence in respect of 
delegated powers, commentators have correctly pointed out that the decision confirmed 
the revised formulation that was handed down.V 
Therefore, the aim of finalizing a single market suffused successive interventions in the 
financial sector up to the EBU, though not without the transposition of some important 
developments concerning the attribution of greater regulatory powers at the European 
level. Consequently, the need to construct the EBU a few years after the establishment of 
the ESFS highlighted the inadequacy of these solutions. So our investigation will now 
indicate the extent to which the EBU represented an element of discontinuity and what 
elements it was able to change. 
Before plunging into this field of investigation it is important to emphasize that the 
EBU also responded to diverse needs and, in particular, the need to interrupt the perverse 
link between the crisis of the private financial system, especially banks, and sovereign 
government debt. In this perspective, some substantial differences clearly emerged with the 
establishment of the ESFS, first among them being the limited scope of the EBU, which is 
focused only on countries with the euro as its official currency. This limited scope is in 
itself a clear reference to the support of another specific European policy, monetary union, 
that has a range of powers different from those of the single market, being centred 
primarily on the European Central Bank (ECB). Although the EBU is ring-fenced by 
guarantees that ensure its separation from the direct governance of the single currency, it is 
clear that its task also exceeds the mere assurance of the single financial market. The 
uncertainties and fibrillations of the credit market are indeed capable of causing serious 
indirect interference in the stability of the single currency and, therefore, ensuring direct 
intervention to prevent and resolve banking crises has become a task entrusted to the EU 
through the controversial use of Article 127.6 TFEU, within mechanisms that affect the 
monetary union. Thus, inevitably, new purposes were added to the task of managing 
European financial entities, even if limited to those having jurisdiction in countries that 
have adopted the single currency. Proof of this is also the fact that the EBU provides a 
coherent response within the Euro-unitary framework of the founding treaty, first, of the 
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European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), and, second, of the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), which offered an immediate, temporary response outside the treaties 
that founded the EU. Somehow the EBU is inscribed in the more general new European 
governance mechanisms which the EU started after the Eurozone crisis erupted (Kjaer 
2010, 25-30). 
However, in the case of the EBU, since its purpose was to create mechanisms ensuring 
the effective transmission of administrative decisions between the European and national 
levels, there was (i) the establishment of new entities, such as the Single Resolution Board 
(SRB) or the Supervisory Board (SB) with effective powers, (ii) complex and multiple 
organizational relations with other European and national authorities, including the ESFS, 
where there are mixed decision-making and coordination needs of very diversified 
interests, (iii) complex procedures with guarantees of participation by interested parties, 
aimed at diversified macro- and micro-prudential decisions, supervision and control, and 
propositions of possible measures of resolution. In this light it is interesting to explore how 
this division of structures and decisions, and complexity of purposes, also includes that of 
ensuring the single market, since reconciliation with the rules that support the single 
market is not called into question (Camilli 2015, 51-52). There are, for example, many links 
that oblige the EBU to operate consistently with the EBA. Indeed, the EBA has the task of 
defining the technical rules of the financial markets through the Single Rulebook which the 
ECB, in its supervisory role, must implement; it likewise establishes a reciprocal 
conditioning link between the EBA and the SRB, since a representative of the latter may be 
appointed to the EBA’s decision-making committee and – in turn – the EBA, whenever 
issues within their jurisdiction are at stake, can delegate a representative to participate in the 
partial or plenary sessions of the SRB’s governing bodies (Cappiello 2015, 434-437). In 
short, the connections with the guarantors of the single market are established precisely to 
ensure the orderly coexistence between the single market and the supervision/resolution 
functions regarding it (Lastra 2013). 
It is important to understand whether this further stage of evolution of European 
organizational models is pursuing this objective as it always has, or whether it is 
introducing innovative elements, and – if so – what results it is producing for bringing 
about the single market. What we need to understand is if another route to the single 
market has been taken. 
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3. The single market in the EBU framework 
 
In the rationales which accompany the founding acts of the EBU there are recurrent 
references to the internal market, for which supervisory and resolution functions are 
important conditions to help build a framework of uniform rules within which credit sector 
operators can work (Magliari 2015). However, besides these basic connections of a general 
nature, there are far more obvious influences that have a significant impact on the single 
market. 
First, we must distinguish between the EBU’s supervisory and resolution functions. 
The first operates, except for some limited power of macro-prudential policy, toward 
ensuring a preventive control of the soundness of credit companies where the single 
market is taken only as a benchmark to be observed without exercising any direct powers, 
as specified in Article 1.1, Reg. EU 1024/2013 (Reg. SSM). However, the second function 
has a direct impact on the functioning of credit companies, determining the conditions for 
continuing or discontinuing its action, with all the implications that this produces. So, 
although EU Reg. 806/2014 (Reg. SRM) also identifies, in the integrity and unity of the 
market, the criteria of action that should inspire the resolution authorities (Article 6.2), the 
constraint of the single market is a much more important condition when making decisions 
on the resolution of credit institutions. References to the internal market and to 
safeguarding its integrity recur far more often with regard to exercising the resolution 
function (Lastra 2013, 1220-1223). 
In particular, this is clear from the objectives listed in Article 14 Reg. SRM, which 
includes, of course, three aims intended to protect the market and two aimed at protecting 
specific subjects for which European legislation provides safeguards. The first three aims 
encompass the guarantees that ensure the continuity of operators in order to alter the 
market as little as possible, to avoid adverse effects on financial stability that could 
jeopardize market order, in particular by preventing contagion, and to minimize public 
financial support, which could alter market conditions. Conversely, among the objectives 
for establishing guarantees for certain categories of subjects, are those aimed at depositors 
of under one hundred thousand euros, investors, as covered by Directive 97/9/EC, funds 
and customers. It would seem, then, that the role of the single market has a specific 
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importance in the exercising of resolution functions, to the extent that it still appears to be 
a central purpose. 
In a similar way, the assessment that the SRB has to make, in developing plans for a 
resolution, is aimed at safeguarding market rules as much as possible. The primary 
objective of the SRB is to decide whether a particular entity can either be subjected to 
ordinary insolvency rules, in the case that financial instability is not at stake, the latter 
meaning that neither the proper functioning, efficiency and integrity of the internal market, 
nor the financial system of one or more Member states are compromised (Art. 10.5). In 
this case the resolution power is that of ordinary provision. Significantly, it is 
recommended that this SRB assessment should take into account the warnings and 
recommendations of the ESRB and the criteria formulated by the EBA. 
What we derive from this is that for the EBU the single market and its smooth 
functioning continues to be a benchmark for measuring the actual achievement of financial 
stability, but the following paragraphs can lead to a different interpretation of these 
conclusions. 
 
4. The concurrence of  the State aid framework 
 
The principal test of the relationship between the EBU and the internal market, in the 
component that is most exposed to this relationship – i.e., the resolution function – is the 
assumption that resolution programs allow for recourse to State aid, when this assumption, 
though discouraged by the SRM, becomes viable (Lastra 2013, 1215). In such 
circumstances, Article 19, Reg. SRM provides that the implementation of the resolution 
program is subject to the favourable, or conditioned, decision expressed by the European 
Commission on compatibility with the internal market, even when recourse to the single 
resolution fund is permitted. The European Commission exercises control on the basis of 
standard procedural, interpretative and regulatory tools, that also utilize procedures for 
State aid unrelated to those for banking resolution. This is very interesting to note because, 
by deferring to normal procedures, it obliges a scrutiny of the kind of assessment that in 
such circumstances the Commission conducts as an independent body that participates in 
the responsibilities of resolution. 
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In such cases, the Commission applies the acts of communication approved since 2008. 
Faced with the threat of massive national bailouts of firms immediately after the start of 
the financial crisis, which would have seriously undermined the single market,VI the 
European Commission, prompted in particular by the European Council, issued a 
‘package’ of special measures between 2008 and 2011, with which it gave the Member 
States a wide range of tools of public support to financial institutions, especially banks and 
businesses.VII The tools available to the States ranged from public guarantees on liabilities 
and on interbank lending, to the recapitalization of banks and firms; from the supervised 
and controlled liquidations of businesses and banks in serious trouble to measures intended 
to free banks of devalued and “toxic” financial assets, to facilitating access to credit for 
nationalization in extreme cases. These were all measures that the Commission deemed 
legitimate under Article 107.3.b., TFEU, with regard to the serious disturbance of national 
economies that the crisis brought about. 
Specifically, the permitted measures were nothing new in themselves, since a large part 
of them were already planned and governed by previous communications issued by the 
Commission under Article. 107.3.c. TFEU (Liberati 2014), particularly in the field of 
bailouts and restructuring of firms in trouble.VIII Despite this, and despite the fact that the 
Commission refers precisely to this discipline to reaffirm their validity, even in the presence 
of the new ‘package’ of measures, the Commission considered it equally urgent to provide 
further guidance for facing the extraordinary situation that had arisen as a result of the 
international financial crisis (Tonetti 2009). The EU’s approach was therefore incremental: 
it did not so much intend to extend the tools that the States already had available, even 
though in truth this occurred in some cases,IX as much as to make them more effective, in 
view of the extraordinary situation that had arisen. 
In fact these rules reaffirm certain principles established at the European level, now 
summarized in the Banking Communication.X The permissible aid must be capable of 
producing minimal distorting effects, and subsequently: the beneficiary enterprises and 
market sectors must be identified in a clear and non-discriminatory way; the beneficiaries 
are also called on to share part of the burden in order not to gain advantages over their 
competitors; the aid must be indispensable,XI namely the aid must be well targeted, 
proportionate and necessary; there is a set of safeguards for minimizing competitive risks; 
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the duration of the aid must be temporary; the rules for selecting beneficiaries are very 
strict and binding (Tridimas 2010). 
This makes it possible to highlight some interesting aspects. The Commission, despite 
an emergency situation, did not abandon the general principles that guide it in the field of 
State aid.XII The consequence is that the communications adopted are reminders that the 
ordinary way to restore an orderly condition of the progress of economic relations remains 
that of the competitive market, limitable only in the cases already anticipated under 
previous guidelines and notices adopted by the Commission. The actual interpretation of 
serious disturbance of national economies to justify the extra aid should be made in 
accordance with the strict criteria established by judicial reviews.XIII Competition and free 
trade among the Member Countries are therefore still the first objectives to be protected. 
Nevertheless, given the situation, the Commission considered it necessary to adopt a new 
aid discipline to prevent and correct grave consequences due to the destabilization of the 
private financial system and systems of production. Their aim therefore was not to rewrite 
the rules of economic relations (Napolitano 2008), but to direct national public initiatives 
within a framework of common European principles. 
It thus seems clear that Article 107.3.b. TFEU was used by the Commission to actively 
coordinate public intervention in the economy of Member States; the norm is not an 
excuse for a general prohibition, but, as has been said,XIV a regulatory clause for the 
coordination of national economic policies. Many of the communications adopted by the 
Commission to tackle the financial crisis explained that the procedure adopted was 
intended to prevent a ‘rush to subsidies’ which would be created among Member States if 
the Commission should fail to take measures of active support (Schwarze 2010). In 
essence, the EU, in facing the onslaught of the crisis, found itself faced with two extreme 
positions: to forbid any state aid that exceeded the limits already defined in other 
communications, a move that would have been totally ineffective during the crisis, or to 
allow Member States to act freely, given that they considered the measures hitherto 
permitted by the EU to be inadequate.  
In other words, the Commission, called upon to choose on whether to adopt a policy 
that privileged a consistency of regulations, trusting in market rules, or to adopt a policy 
that enhanced extreme differentiation but with the risk of compromising the unitary 
principles of European law, chose a middle ground, namely regulating the aid policy of the 
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Member States. In this role, the discretion exercised by the European Commission was 
necessarily significant, because, as was also reaffirmed recently in the Kotnik case,XV the 
communications issued by the European Commission, while determining a self-limitation 
of the power of restraining aids granted by Member States, also did not oblige them to 
accord to them, from which it follows that the Member States were still free to notify aid 
granted under conditions other than those set out by the communications, and to submit 
themselves to the Commission’s discretional evaluation. 
In the case of resolution procedures operated by the SRB that provided for the use of a 
single fund, its discretional power was further accentuated. Article 19 Reg. SRM provided 
for the possibility of the Commission to review its decision at any time, based on a 
recommendation submitted by the SRB or on its own initiative, so that, in essence, the 
Commission was endowed with a sort of jus poenitendi that was subject to a very limited 
judicial review. Such broad discretionary features were further confirmed by Article 20 Reg. 
SRM, which provided that, if the revision of an earlier decision on State aid is requested by 
a Member State, the Council, acting unanimously, must decide on derogation within seven 
days, or, in the event of inaction, the Commission itself may do so again. Note that the 
Commission in this latter circumstance exercises power that the Council failed to use, 
which characterizes it as a true outcome of a highly discretionary decision. 
What has been observed up to now highlights the fact that the application of guidelines 
on State aid, theoretically aimed at protecting the internal market, is a source of more 
complex indications than appears at first sight. In part this is due to the very nature of the 
guidelines on State aid that grant the European Commission a true active coordinating 
power over State policies and, if it is the SRB that acts, also over European subjects; but, in 
the case of resolution procedures which result in the use of the single fund, the 
Commission’s power is characterized in actual political terms, meaning by this expression 
of a power more of pure discretion than a technical power (M. P. Chiti 2014). In other 
words, the market-based paradigm is not the only yardstick of the resolution procedure 
(Ioannidis 2016): even if State aids are a measure of last resort, they are a possible tool in 
the event of the use of the single fund meaning that internal market protection can be 
subordinated to other interests of financial stability. 
Moreover, the Commission’s discretion, which occurs within the framework of the 
SRM, or when the assessments regarding only the countries which have adopted the euro, 
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is wider when compared to when the Commission, but also the Council, applies the 
guidelines on State aid outside EBU borders, thus marking a difference, albeit contained. 
As we have seen, the Commission is not only authorized to intervene with another EU 
body (i.e. SRB) but can review its position even at very short notice. 
 
5. The protection of  the public interest: financial stability 
 
Recourse to State aid is, as mentioned in resolution procedures, an extreme solution, 
since it is conditioned by a prior appeal to shareholders, bondholders and creditors for 
burden-sharing. This is the so-called bail-in system, which derives from concerns on the 
limiting of the use of tools that alter competitive market conditions (Wojcik 2016). 
Nevertheless, even from this perspective one can see how administrative procedures at the 
European level subsequent to the SRM produced effects of innovation in safeguarding the 
internal market. 
Indeed, Article 18.1 established that among the conditions that make the resolution 
program applicable, with its typified contents, there is a recognition of the public interest in 
such measures (Sciascia 2015a, 111-115). Public interest acts, therefore, as a legitimizing 
factor of the resolution power, which gives the responsible parties – the European bodies, 
as will be seen shortly – the authority to restrict the liberty of financial operators (Wojcik 
2016, 116-126). Citing the public interest as a legitimizing factor highlights the fact that the 
legislative provision for resolution power is, by itself, not considered a sufficient condition 
to thus qualify the intervention of subjects entrusted with this task, almost as if one wished 
to attribute to this express qualification an additional decisional capacity (De Vauplane 
2012, 274). 
It is actually a rather unusual condition in the panorama of EU law, which rarely 
explicitly assigns the task of protecting public interests to bodies of the European Union. 
Actually, as demonstrated by abundant case law,XVI the European legal system is usually 
willing to accommodate reasons of public interest, claimed by Member States, as a suitable 
motivation to allow for exemptions to prohibitions or obligations originating from the EU. 
The confirmation of this additional meaning, which the explicit mention of public 
interest grants, emerges in paragraph 5 (Article 18), where it is clarified that the public 
interest includes the resolution measures that proportionately pursue the aims defined in 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
167 
Article 14 Reg. SRM, cited above, and on the proviso that there is evidence of impairment 
of the ordinary provisions for managing the conditions of insolvency. In other words, the 
qualification of public interest serves to legitimize the power of imposing resolution 
measures to compel subjects, that legitimately boast claims against the credit institution 
subject to resolution, to fulfil their duties. 
Article 18 Reg. SRM actually explains that qualifying certain measures as being of 
public interest authorized the imposition of restrictions on the freedoms of individuals and, 
in this case, the right of ownership of securities and their values. The imposition of bail-in 
measures can end up obliging private investors to suffer the hardships of the credit 
institution’s losses, the conversion of venture capital, the devaluation of values, and much 
more. It was therefore a classic dynamic of conflict between authority and freedom, where 
the freedoms curtailed by European authorities would in this case be precisely that of the 
investors. 
This prediction received notable confirmation by the CJEU in the course of 2016 about 
resolution cases activated by the Member States on the basis of legal premises, in which the 
EU acted in a conditioning capacity. In the Kotnik case, for example, the CJEU described 
the guarantee of the stability of the financial system as a public interest, and this reduced 
the ability of the principle of legitimate expectation to protect the subjective condition on 
some investors, who complained about the alleged (and illegitimate) modification of the 
Commission’s conduct in relation to state aid to banking credit (Raganelli 2016). In its 
judgment the Euro-unitary judge made it clear that even if the European Commission had 
actually adopted different decisions from past ones to protect the stability of the financial 
system, the decision can be intended to protect a superior public interest, to which other 
prominent public interests would be subordinated, such as legitimate expectations. However, in 
the Kotnik case the possibility of compressing the full right to property consisting of credit 
loans, as well as the limitation of subordinated rights, was justified by the fact that, 
according to the CJEU, the banking communication limited itself to setting a condition for 
State aid to be granted. But it was clearly a logical artifice, since that condition led in any 
case to utilizing restrictive instruments of credit when – as in the Kotnik case – the banks 
had capital shortfalls that could not be dealt with by using ordinary tools. In other words, 
Kotnik confirmed the full application of Article 18 Reg. SRM, where the binding effects of 
the resolution are clearly spelled out. 
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In the Ledra case,XVII the issue was the legitimacy of restrictive provisions put in place 
by Cypriot authorities of some Cypriot banks’ creditors’ rights, based on a conditioning 
agreement in accordance with the ESM Treaty. Here, the CJEU assigned to financial 
stability the qualification of general interest, on the basis of which Article 52 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights justified limitations on the right of ownership, thus equating it with 
what Article 18 SRM qualifies as public interest. 
Lastly, in the Dowling case,XVIII which also emerged from a recapitalization program 
undertaken on the basis of conditions set out for financing within the ESM framework, the 
CJEU countered the arguments of the shareholders, obliged to participate in a 
recapitalization program with a consequent devaluation of their securities, with the higher 
public interest of financial stability. Interestingly, the CJEU stressed that, although there is 
in the EU a public interest for safeguarding shareholders and creditors, “this interest 
cannot be considered dominant in all circumstances with respect to the public interest in 
ensuring the stability of the financial system”. Thus, here again the idea emerges of a 
superior interest in financial stability which is also able to prevail over the interests of 
creditors, even though these too are classified as public. 
Therefore, from the perspective of case-law, the public interest in Article 18 Reg. SRM 
is revealed as a higher interest, a general interest legitimized directly by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, and even a public interest hierarchically superior to those of other 
public interests (Raganelli 2016). As just noted, it marries significantly with the provisions 
of Article 18.7 Reg. SRM, which establishes that the resolution program is subject to the 
Commission, which can suggest that the Council deny its adoption in the absence of the 
public interest. It follows, in accordance with the findings in the previous section on State 
aid, that the assessment of public interest is subject to a highly discretionary prerogative by 
the Commission and Council. Thus it is evident that the power of resolution presents itself 
as a broad discretionary power, which is exercised through the consideration of other 
interests, some of which are also public, and able to restrict basic rights that are 
traditionally protected by the EU (Macchia 2016). 
There is a significant coincidence with the opinions of some authors drawing the same 
conclusions about the predominance of financial stability when they commented on the 
OMT case:XIX market integrity is less and less a key interest compared to financial stability 
(Beukers 2014; Ioannidis 2016; Pennesi 2016). 
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6. Accountability and legitimacy 
 
The EBU presents itself as a composite structure, whose responsibilities are shared 
among various authorities, partly national and partly European, where among the latter 
some are newly created as a result of secondary legislation, while others were already in 
force. This complex of authorities and relationships between authorities, combined with 
the growth of discretionary powers highlighted above, raises important questions for the 
responsibility which must be exercised and the forms of guarantee of the stakeholders 
(Lenaerts 2014, 767-769). In this sense both the SSM and the SRM devote specific 
provisions to the issue by adopting a variety of solutions that can be divided into three 
categories: i) responsibility for activities carried out in general; ii) responsibilities for 
individual measures; iii) transparency. 
With regard to the first category, firstly the authorities appointed at the top of the two 
mechanisms, i.e., the SB of the ECB with regard to the SSM and the SRB with regard to 
the SRM, are required to link up with the European Parliament and, as appropriate, also 
with the Council, the Commission, the Eurogroup and the Court of Auditors. The 
presidents of the SB and the SRB transmit to all these subjects the Annual Activity Report 
(Article 20 Reg. SSM; Article 45 Reg. SRM), which the relative presidents must submit to 
the European Parliament at a public hearing, as well as to the Eurogroup in the case of the 
SB, and to the Council in the case of the SRB. Public hearings before the authorized bodies 
of the Parliament, the Eurogroup and the Council can be arranged at the request of the 
latter in relation to the performance of the duties assigned by the regulations to the SB and 
the SRB, in the same way that a duly motivated written response has made them 
compulsory to queries or issues raised by the Parliament or the Council and the 
Eurogroup. Of interest in this respect are also inter-institutional agreements, that the two 
EBU authorities have signed with the European Parliament, that regulate in minute detail 
ways of reinforcing the relationship between these institutions, and the possibility of calling 
restricted meetings between representatives of the SB and the SRB and presidents of 
Parliament and/or presidents of the relevant parliamentary committees for specific in-
depth examinations. However, relations with the European Parliament do not stop at the 
activity carried out in verifying formally assigned tasks, but also develop around other 
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information, since the SB and the SRB are also required to take into account the use of 
allocated resources, organization and personnel with regard to selection procedures, 
informal communications given to operators and subjects who the SB and the SRB 
address, informal consultations, and yet more. In other words, all the activity undertaken 
by the top authorities of the EBU is connected with the European Parliament in the form 
of sharing a massive quantity of information (De Bellis 2015, 87; Ibrido 2017, 238-244). 
To this must also be added a specific connecting procedure with national parliaments, 
to which the presidents of the SB and the SRB must also transmit their annual report, with 
the possibility of critical feedback (Ibrido 2017, 248-252). The involvement of national 
parliaments makes a less invasive check than in the European Parliament possible, because 
the powers of the SB and the SRB involve no legal obligations, yet there can be forms of 
connection that resound more forcefully on public opinion than are available to the 
European Parliament. Indeed, national parliaments can ask to express their explicit remarks 
in writing, and may even invite the presidents or other members of the authorities for an 
exchange of opinions about the interventions regarding specific Member States. 
Overall the top-level structures of the EBU are required to give an account of their 
activities and to answer the observations made by various relevant authorities, and 
especially to parliamentary authorities in a circuit of democratic accountability that seems 
resilient. However, a point to be stressed in this context is that no specific form of 
connection has been developed for the Commission and the Council, though they too are 
resolution authorities with broad powers. This can of course be explained by the fact that 
these authorities already receive specific linkage attention with the European Parliament, 
directly governed by the founding treaties, but we stress the fact to indicate the special 
condition of the Council, which is both a resolution organ, hence theoretically subject to 
supervision, and an organ of assessment of the SRB’s resolution activities, thus forming a 
kind of self-controlling authority. In this sense, therefore, the circuit of democratic 
accountability does not appear even well defined, not least in view of the fact that the 
Council, though made up of national government representatives, is still a distinct, 
autonomous body. 
As to the responsibility for singular acts by the authorities of supervision and resolution 
functions, general provisions hold, and Article 263 TFEU is applied in the judicial review 
of actions taken by the Commission, the Council and the ECB. An indirect confirmation 
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comes from Article 86 Reg. SRM, which recalls Article 263 TFEU regarding provisions 
made by the SRB, which are therefore covered by general conditions required for the other 
authorities. This means that at the level of judicial review the expansion of discretionary 
powers established in the above-mentioned cases has no specific balancing of the judges’ 
powers. This can also be argued in the light of Article 13 Reg. SSM and 37 Reg. SRM, 
which, with reference to another very effective power attributed to the SB and the SRB, 
namely the inspection of market players, state that, even where it is necessary to obtain the 
prior written consent of national judicial authorities, this is limited to checking that the 
reasons for the inspection are not arbitrary and disproportionate, without actually 
reviewing the merits, or having the right to get additional information about the request. 
This is a clear limitation of national judicial power, even if at the same time the cited 
provisions establish the jurisdiction of the CJEU on the matter, though it has no preventive 
power of authorization. 
The administrative bodies designed for the review, respectively the Administrative 
Board of Review (Directive 24 Reg. SSM) and the Appeal Panel (Directive 85 Reg. SRM) at 
least partially compensate for these deficits of pinpointed control of jurisdiction (Sciascia 
2015b, 383-387). However, while Article. 24 Reg. SSM gives a generalized competence of 
control over supervisory acts regarding both procedural and substantive matters, Article 85 
Reg. SRM is not as broad and, above all, only limits powers of control to certain provisions 
that the SRB can take, which do not include those established in Article 18 and 19, to 
which special attention has been given in this paper. Therefore, even with reference to a 
review of an administrative nature, the broad discretionary powers exercised, especially in 
relation to the resolution, do not find adequate counter-measures in terms of controls. 
Lastly, still in regard to the individual measures, the regulations establishing the SSM 
and the SRM regulate procedural right in a variety of ways. In particular, the hearing of a 
contradictory opinion and an ample right of access in the proceedings relating to 
supervision by the persons directly affected by the final acts are recognized, in accordance 
with Article 22 Reg. SSM, while this extension of rights is limited only to penalty 
proceedings in the case of a resolution function, as per Article 40 Reg. SRM. In general 
terms the SRM simply foresees applying the general rules of access to documents 
established in Reg. EC 1049/2001, which is thus also extended to the SRB. It follows that 
from the perspective of procedural and participatory rights, the reinforcement of 
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protection is partial and, in any case, absent in the presence of the very incisive powers 
over internal markets that governance over the resolution function provides. 
The last parameter by which to measure accountability in exercising the functions 
included in the EBU is transparency (Alemanno 2014). In spite of a general reference to 
the right to access and some specific disclosure requirements regarding penalizations, 
according to Article 41 Reg. SRM, there are a lot of references in which the regulations 
concerning supervision and resolution ensure the secrecy or confidentiality of information. 
Starting with the relationships that the SB and the SRB develop with the European 
Parliament, where specific procedures are provided, private meetings can be held with no 
obligation to keep records or give news through press conferences. The protocol on the 
resolution function also expressly refers to the general protection protocol regarding 
personal data but, unlike its function in regulating access, it extends the relative obligations 
to the Commission and the Council as well, in their exercise of resolution powers and not 
only, therefore to the SRB (Article 89 Reg. SRM). 
This tendency to enhance the confidentiality of information is even clearer in the 
regulation on resolution, which refers to Article 88 Reg. SRM’s scrupulous safeguard of 
professional secrecy. The activity carried out by SRB officials and other authorities 
involved is definitely based on the principle of official secrecy. The same Article 88.5 Reg. 
SRM establishes a relationship between the presupposition of confidentiality of 
information and public interest, in the sense that disclosure of information must be 
conditioned by assessing the impact this can have on the public interest concerning 
financial, monetary or economic policies, commercial interests on operators and 
inspections, and investigations and audits. Confidentiality is therefore considered a value 
for protecting the public interest. 
Conclusively, the value of transparency of the acts and activities included in the 
supervisory and resolution procedures is impaired in favour of confidentiality, so as to 
become an essentially useless tool in enforcing the accountability of authorities who 
perform administrative functions in the credit sector. This is due to the assumption that 
performance of supervision and resolution in financial policies hinges on the ability to keep 
restricted data and information, but transparency seems destined to get a broad scope of 
derogation, even beyond what is appropriate. It is worthwhile noting that transparency is 
never associated with public interest, as opposed to confidentiality. 
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7. Concluding remarks 
 
The EBU represents a case in which the EU is experimenting with original forms of 
administrative integration, in respect of functions that have an impact on the single market. 
Unlike the architectures of authority employed so far by the EU to safeguard the internal 
market, the EBU introduces significant innovations that can be summarized thus: decisions 
relating to the internal market tend to take on a connotation of increasing political 
discretion at the expense of technical judgment. Until now the growth of the administrative 
apparatus at the supranational level has functioned to neutralize the political conditioning 
that especially characterizes national governments, which is usually considered as an 
obstacle to completing the internal market. However, it now seems that the proliferation of 
authorities, and the complexity of the mechanisms that govern coexistence, find in 
discretionary political judgment its extreme synthesis for leading everything back to unity. 
In this sense the EBU strengthens the well-known phenomenon of ‘fragmentation of the 
executive powers’ (Ibrido 2017, 278-286) in the EU legal system with the introduction, 
though, of an acknowledged discretionary power, particularly in the monetary and financial 
policy. Overall the EBU seems likely to be able reproduce two types of trends: an 
administrative integration that actually contains a problematic coexistence of conflicting 
interests, or an administrative integration that develops a unified process based on several 
gradated layers (Magliari 2015, 207-210). 
This is not at odds with the internal market, but establishes renewed equilibriums. It 
distinguishes and identifies the public interest, that of financial stability (Tuori-Tuori 2014), 
which becomes the ranking point to which all other interests, including public ones, are 
subordinated. The technical assessment of the conditions that sustain the market turns out 
to be an essential element of knowledge, which, however, is not automatically a rule, an act 
or a decision. The decisive moment is distinct and separate. Somehow a dynamic between 
the time for evaluation and the time for decision, which until a few years ago was the 
exclusive purview of nation states, has been reconstituted on a larger scale, but in the 
meantime the answerable subjects have changed and only partly coincide with national 
ones. 
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If the understanding of the internal market, measured till now on a kind of gradient of 
technical/political rapport, established a clear predominance of the former element, the 
EBU manifests a shift of this balance towards the political nature of decisions, whose main 
attribution is given to supranational bodies (Veitch 2012). This is evident when the Council 
comes into play, but is not that different from the hypothesis in which the Commission 
and even the new supranational authorities of the EBU intervene. Tipping the balance 
towards the side of political terms means taking on the dialectic of interests with greater 
care, recognizing a number of rationales and attempting to adopt solutions that establish a 
dynamic and non-automatic equilibrium (Macchia 2015, 1617-1618; Ibrido 2017, 194). 
Something new, probably in the middle of a Communitarian Method and an 
Intergovernmental Method, is coming into view. 
Is this step accompanied by adequate safeguards for democratic control (Curtin-
Mendes 2011, 116-121)? The answers the EBU case offers tell us that this only partially 
occurs. We are definitely witnessing a trend toward strengthened connections with 
parliamentary institutions, primarily the European parliament, and then national 
parliaments, which gain some freedom for direct contacts with the European authorities, 
though this does not take place without the presence of important limitations and some 
exceptions. On other fronts, however, the truth is even less reassuring. Judicial review is 
very limited and in some cases even virtually absent (De Vauplane 2012, 574); 
administrative safeguards, which must still be concretely tried, appear only partially capable 
of filling the gaps of jurisdictional protection. Even the limited recognitions of procedural 
rights are scarcely encouraging, since at best they are reaffirmed in their general terms in 
the face of new powers that appear much more incisive. Publicity and transparency seem 
recessive values in contrast to confidentiality and secrecy, indicating a deep link of the latter 
with public interests. Basically the gradient shift does not seem to find a strong balance in 
terms of accountability, formerly sacrificed exclusively in favour of organized interests 
when the technical component prevailed. 
In a complex system, like the European, the transfer of decision quota from the 
technical to the political level certainly involves a shift in the balance of power, which 
apparently sees that of the economic operators as recessive, as compared with that of the 
governing authorities. However, the still insufficient balance of control tools for 
democratic governance conceals the emergence of power relationships that seem to 
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coalesce according to the prevalent interests of certain Member States. It is worth recalling 
the role of the Intergovernmental Agreement of 2014 in heavily affecting the use of the 
Single Resolution Fund in order to prevent the real mutualisation of losses. Restoring the 
political gradient of decisions does not favour solidarity issues, but new public interests 
(Baroncelli 2016) behind which other partial pre-existing interests are hidden. A new 
financial constitution is emerging (Mostacci 2013), without reliable linkages capable of 
challenging what Lindseth called the ‘democratic disconnect’ (Lindseth 2010, 234).  
Time, and the consolidation of such solutions, will tell us which direction will prevail; 
in the meantime, guarantees for the internal market are bound to change shape and 
equilibriums. 
                                                 
 The author is a associate professor of Administrative Law at the Sapienza University of Rome. Email: 
fabio.giglioni@uniroma1.it. 
I I skip any comment on this feature to my previous writing (Giglioni 2015). 
II See the Commission communication A roadmap towards a Banking Union, COM/2012/510 final. 
III The ESAs were established by the EU Regulations 1093/2010 (EBA), 1094/2010 (EIOPA), 1095 (ESMA) 
and 1092/2010 (ERSB). 
IV CJEU, Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v. European Parliament and Council. 
V See Adamski (2014), Chamon (2014) and Simoncini (2015a).  
VI The crisis was triggered in 2007 in the USA because of sub-prime mortgages and it spread rapidly to 
Europe because of the high exposure of banks and European financial institutions with regard to these tools. 
Initially Europe reacted with some rescue measures that were already governed appropriately by some of the 
Commission’s communications on state aid in the rescue and restructuring of enterprises (see the decisions: 
June 4, 2008, 2009/341/EC, Sachsen LB, in Guce, 2009, L 104, October 21, 2008, 2009/775/CE, IKB, in 
Guce, 2009, L 278, October 28, 2009, 2010/262 / EC, Northern Rock, in Guce, 2010, L 112). But after the 
failure of Lehman Brothers the crisis worsened significantly and the ordinary tools adopted until then no longer 
seemed adequate, given the fact that the Commission normally takes at least a year to decide on the aid 
notifications for which it considers it necessary to initiate a conformity evaluation procedure. Given the 
gravity of the situation, in two cases at least, by the Commission’s own admission (see the report on state aid 
updated to spring 2009 COM (2009) 164 final), aid was granted to the limits of legitimacy in the absence of 
restructuring plans by the recipient firm, which led the Community authorities to adopt new, more effective 
and timely tools; see decisions October 1, 2008, C(2008)5673 final, Bradford & Bingley and October 2, 2008 
C(2008)5735, Hypo Real Estate. 
VII The tools permitted were those included in the following Commission communications: one on the 
banking sector, The application of the rules on State aid adopted for financial institutions in the context of the current global 
financial crisis 2008/C 270/02 and subsequent amendments; the one on recapitalization, The recapitalization of 
financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to a necessary minimum and safeguards against undue 
distortions of competition, 2009/C 10/03; the one on impaired assets, treatment of activities that have suffered an 
impairment loss in the Community banking sector, 2009/C 72/01; Temporary Community framework for measures to support 
access to finance the current situation of financial and economic crisis, 2009/C 83/01; the one on restructuring, the return 
to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the rules on State aid, 
2009/C 195/04; the one on exiting from the crisis, relative to the application, from January 1, 2011, of the rules on 
state aid to support measures for banks during the financial crisis. Another is in the works and is founded on the basis 
of the DG Staff Working Document, with the title The application of state aid rules to government guarantee schemes 
covering bank debt to be issued after 30 June 2011, which marks a further step for exiting the system of exceptional 
aid under Directive 107, p. 3, letter b) TFEU.  
VIII The reference is to the Communication from the Commission, Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing 
and restructuring firms in difficulty, 2004/C 244/02, enacted on the basis of Directive 107, p. 3, letter c) TFEU. 
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The communication is also taken into account with a view to phasing out the emergency aid package that the 
European Commission has followed so far as ordinary future reference discipline. 
IX The aid measures of the Impaired Assets Communication appear to innovate the range of tools made 
available by the communication on rescue and restructuring of firms in difficulty. An example is the 
opportunity that is given to the beneficiaries not to include in the budget heavily devalued securities or to 
allocate public resources to equalize the losses due to the devaluation of the securities; see communication 
2009/C 72/01, p. 15. See also Liberati (2014). 
X The new communication in force since August 2013 is exactly that of the Commission, The application of rules 
on State aid to support measures for banks during the financial crisis in 2013/C 216/01. 
XI In the case of Austria, the Commission noted for instance that no private investor would have offered a 
series of bank guarantees that for intensity and breadth covered practically the full Austrian banking system 
under great stress, and this is considered as an essential element for judging the help granted as being 
indispensable; see Decision, December 9, 2008, C(2008) 8408 final. 
XII Explicit in this regard is the Banking Communication: see 2008/C 270/02, p. 3. 
XIII See Court of First Instance, December 15, 1999, T-132/96 and T-143/96, Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen 
Sachsen GmbH c. Commission, Rec. 1999, II-3663, p. 167, where it is clear that the serious disturbance in the 
national economy should be understood as concerning the economy of the entire country and not just certain 
territorial areas. That approach was also followed by the European Commission: see the decisions of the 
Committee, May 20, 1998, 98/490/EC, Crédit Lyonnais, in Guce, 1998 L 221; June 27, 2007 2008/263 / EC, 
BAWAG-PSK, in Guce, 2008, L 83. 
XIV See Battini (1994), who has stressed the primarily function of coordination of State aids rather than the 
function of safeguarding competition. 
XV CJEU, Case C-526/14, Kotnik et al. v. Drzavni zbor Republike Slovenije. 
XVI See, for instance, CJEU, Case C-399/14, Grüne Liga Sachsen eV et al. v. Freeistaat Sachsen, related to the use 
of public interest for the inclusion of the sites of Community importance; CJEU, Case C-346/14, European 
Commission v. Austria, related to the sustainable development principle; CJEU, Case C-15/13, Technische 
Universität Hamburg-Harburg et al. v. Datenlotsen Informationssystheme GmbH, related to the use of public interest 
for in-house providing; CJEU, Case C-351/12, OSA v. Léčebné lázně Mariánské Lázně a.s., related to the limits 
for the freedom to provide sevices. 
XVII CJEU, Case from C-8/15-P to C-10/15-P, Ledra Advertising Ltd. et al. v. European Commission and European 
Central Bank.  
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